For Ukraine, the process of nation-building has involved a thorough rejection of anything to do with Russia and severance of all contacts with it. In Moscow, U. In Russian eyes, the most dangerous element of U.
For Russians, the Atlantic alliance is a U. The United States is unlikely to stop supporting its Ukrainian clients, Russian leaders believe. Without acknowledging it, Washington cannot ignore the possibility that such a move, even before it is consummated, might precipitate a preemptive Russian action. Should the conflict escalate, Russia will have an edge in escalation dominance. A prudent U. Confrontation is here to stay, at least for the medium term. Possibilities for any serious U.
Whatever the outcome of the elections, the U. This attitude will express itself in ever-mounting sanctions pressure. The specter of an all-powerful America having no real use for Russia while seeking to hurt it whenever it can will, in turn, be used by the Kremlin and its allies to shore up Russian patriotism and civic nationalism.
Vladimir Putin regards President Donald Trump as a realist politician, defending and promoting the U. He believes he can do business with Trump on the basis of Russian and American interests. Alas, Putin also has to acknowledge that the embattled U. Apart from U. Russians see past and present Ukrainian leaders as desperately trying to ingratiate themselves with those who wield power in the White House or are likely to emerge as winners in U. During this trying period, the United States and Russia need to prevent direct military collision between themselves.
Unlike during the Cold War, the worst might now result not from a premeditated all-out attack, but rather from accidents, incidents or proxy conflicts escalating to a dangerous level. More substantive dialogue will remain severely constrained.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author s and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
In an increasingly crowded, chaotic, and contested world and marketplace of ideas, the Carnegie Moscow Center offers decisionmakers global, independent, and strategic insight and innovative ideas that advance international peace. In the 18th, the Swedes invaded only to be defeated by Peter the Great. The military, to no surprise, took this idea as an article of faith. Just as no country has done what Russia has done to protect others from aggressors, so runs the belief, no other country has itself also been such a frequent target of aggression.
That legacy also feeds a national narrative, one nurtured over centuries, not just of epic proportion but of epic persuasion that can serve multiple purposes. First, and perhaps foremost, it can be invoked whenever Russia is painted as an aggressor. It ensures a presumption of innocence and just cause, no matter the action taken. The first instance was at the end of the 18th century in order to eliminate the threat posed by the Crimean Tatars who for centuries had raided Russia in pursuit of its most lucrative resource: Russians themselves bound for the slave markets of the Middle East.
The second time, of course, was in when Russia argued it was protecting Russians on the peninsula from an ostensibly hostile Ukrainian government.
Here, too, one can go back to the Mongols. By attacking Russia as well. Also driving this suspicion of the West, besides the sheer number of invasions, is that the invaders have often been coalitions of nations, as if engaged in a collective conspiracy against Russia. Not for nothing do state-sponsored advertisements replay a joke favored by Tsar Alexander III in the late 19th century — but no longer in jest.
And in the hyper-patriotic climate it has caused, political opposition can be tagged as treason, and foreign entities on Russian soil easily rebranded as foreign agents. In fact, the legitimacy of the office of president is inseparable from the aura of war. The regime strengthened its relations with the Church. Eurasianist ideas began to be voiced by Kremlin ideologists. Putin backed the idea originally proposed by the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev of creating a Eurasian Economic Union, and in the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia agreed to set a target of establishing one by Putin was determined to include Ukraine in this Eurasian Union, but the Ukrainians in Maidan were equally determined to join Europe.
Two proposals that had been floated during the negotiations were first resisted and then shelved by the AK Party. They could take pride in the achievements of the Soviet period—the industrialization of the country, the defeat of Nazi Germany and Soviet science and technology—which had given meaning to their lives and to the sacrifices they had made.
For millions of Russians, Putin was restoring national pride. The constant refrain in his speeches is the need for Russia to be given more respect, to be treated as an equal by the West. He has frequently complained about the hypocrisy and double standards of the West, which invades Iraq in the name of freedom but imposes sanctions on Russia when it defends what it describes as its legitimate interests in the Crimea.
Both men share a mystical conception of Russia as an empire that is not defined by territorial boundaries. Today, on his orders, a portrait of the Tsar hangs in the antechamber of the presidential office in the Kremlin. The French troops remained in Rome to protect the Pope until Click Enter. Login Profile. Es En. Economy Humanities Science Technology. Multimedia OpenMind books Authors. Digital World.
Featured author. Thomas W. Latest book. Work in the Age of Data. Start Russia and Europe. Humanities Politics. Culture Europe History Integration. Orlando Figes. Estimated reading time Time 19 to read.
The Russians have always been uncertain about their place in Europe. That ambivalence is an important aspect of their cultural history and identity.
Living on the margins of the continent, they have never been quite sure if their destiny is there. Are they of the West or of the East? Feelings of ambivalence and insecurity, of envy and resentment towards Europe, have long defined the Russian national consciousness—and they still do today. The two were never far apart. In every educated Russian there was both a Westernizer and a Slavophile. If Russia could not become an equal part of Europe there were always those who were prepared to argue that it ought to take more pride in being different.
Cossacks watching a screen featuring Vladimir Putin in Simferopol, the capital of the Republic of Crimea, on April Download Kindle 1. Download EPUB 1. Download PDF Do you want to stay up to date with our new publications? Receive the OpenMind newsletter with all the latest contents published on our website Find out more here.
More publications related to this article Politics. The UK and Europe. Comments on this publication Login to comment Log in Subscribe. Thank you for collaborating with the OpenMind community! Your comment will be published after validation. Please, try again later. Next article. Bichara Khader.
0コメント